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# Predictions based on action intention facilitate the recognition of stochastic regularities Betina Korka, Erich Schröger, Andreas Widmann

# INTRODUCTION

- The predictive coding theories suggest that the brain is continuously building up and updating predictive models.
- Sources for predictions may be drawn from sensory regularities in



## **METHOD**

- **Participants:** 14 (8 male, mean y.o. = 23,3).
- Task instructions: press a key about every second to generate  $\checkmark$ tones, without producing fixed patterns.

a bottom-up manner based on feed-forward prediction error, as suggested when regularity violations lead to elicitation of the mismatch negativity (MMN) component.

• Recently, Schröger & Roeber (2020) showed that **stochastic regularities** are difficult to encode: their data indicate that rare deviants of medium pitch enclosed between frequent high and low pitch standards do not elicit the MMN, unless the standards are arranged **deterministically** (e.g., alternating high and low).

• Here, we wanted to test the implication of the predictive coding theory that predictions based on higher order generative models, for example based on action intention, are fed top-down in the hierarchy to sensory levels. We asked participants to produce random sequences of high and low pitch sounds by key presses in two conditions: In a condition with *hand-specific associations*, one button produced high and the other low pitch sounds; In a condition with *unspecific associations*, both buttons randomly produced high or low-pitch sounds.

• We expected that the rare medium pitch deviants elicited a larger MMN in the *specific* compared to the unspecific condition, despite the actual sound sequences being actually stochastic in both conditions.

Stimuli: 1000 Hz for the **deviant**  $\checkmark$ (with 10% probability) and 900 Hz and 1100 Hz for the standards (each with 45% probability).

**Conditions:** *specific* vs.  $\checkmark$ *unspecific associations*, identical in terms of physical stimulation, but higherorder predictions based on intention are only possible in the first case.



 $\checkmark$ **EEG recording:** BrainAmp system, actiCAP, 32 electrodes; Online reference: the tip of the nose; EOG activity: electrodes placed on the outer canthi and below the left eye.

**EEG preprocessing:** data were filtered (0.1 to 45 Hz) and  $\checkmark$ epoched relative to tone onset (-200, 600 ms). Artifacts were rejected using ICA; The MMN was identified using a temporal PCA (Geomin rotation, covariance relationship matrix, no weighting).

# RESULTS



Frontocentral ROI

[µV]

Amplitude

#### 2: Principal Component Analysis

#### *3: Early and Late MMN Components*



### CONCLUSION

• The observed larger MMN responses in the *hand-specific* condition indicate that intention-based predictions can boost stochastic regularity-based predictions; this extends previous findings indicating that action intention alone (i.e. in the absence of auditory regularities) leads to predictions at sensory levels (Korka et al., 2019). Nevertheless, we also find a weak MMN when higher order predictions based on intention are not possible (in the *unspecific* condition) — it thus remains for future research to clarify the precise and necessary conditions for the encoding of stochastic regularities.

• Finally, these results demonstrate that under certain task conditions, active inference (i.e. predictions based on expected action effects) can enhance the sensory inference (i.e. predictions based on encoded environmental regularities).

#### Statistical analyses

Bayesian rANOVAs with factors *Condition* (specific vs. unspecific associations) x *Stimulus type* (Standard vs. Deviant) were calculated for each MMN. BF<sub>Inclusion</sub> calculated across matched models are reported here, while the BF<sub>10</sub> refer to the pairwise follow-up comparisons. If **the BF >3 (or <0.33)**  $\rightarrow$ evidence for the alternative (or null) hypothesis.

**Early MMN:** the main effect of *Stimulus type* explains the data best (BF<sub>Inclusion</sub> = 29125.42), suggesting MMN effects in both conditions. Follow-up Bayesian *t*-tests confirm that the **MMN was elicited in both conditions** (specific associations:  $BF_{10} = 92.41 \pm 40.001\%$ ; unspecific associations:  $BF_{10} = 9.98$ ±0.001). A further Bayesian *t*-test calculated on the difference scores (Deviant – Standard) brings evidence that the MMN in the case of specific associations is larger (BF<sub>10</sub> = 11.11  $\pm \leq 0.001\%$ ).

Late MMN: similarly, the main effect of *Stimulus type* explains the data best (BF<sub>Inclusion</sub> = 47.7). Yet, the presence of the **MMN** is confirmed **for the specific associations** (BF<sub>10</sub> = 23.94  $\pm \leq 0.001$ %), while the evidence regarding the unspecific condition is rather inconclusive (BF $_{10}$  = 1.07 ± 0.004%).



Ref.: Korka, B., Schröger, E., & Widmann, A. (2019). Action Intention-based and Stimulus Regularity-based Predictions: Same or Different?. / Cog Neurosci, 31(12), 1917-1932.; Schröger, E., & Roeber, U. (2020). Encoding of deterministic and stochastic auditory rules in the human brain: The mismatch negativity mechanism does not reflect basic probability. Hearing Res, 107907.; Stefanics, G., Kremláček, J., & Czigler, I. (2014). Visual mismatch negativity: a predictive coding view. Frontiers in human neurosci, 8, 666.